Tuesday, January 30, 2007

Google to the world: Botnets will pwn the internet

CNet News is reporting that botnets pose a danger to the Internet. -- All FUD aside, my research does agree with this statement:
With new levels of sophistication this has reached a real milestone," Sunner added. "Botnets are getting smaller, more stealthy and more discreet and yet the volumes of spam are going up.


More botnet operators are splitting up their networks as a protection method. We call this "Distributed C&C's", or DC&Cs. The reasons for doing this are two fold,

First its harder to find C&C's with only a thousand drones, than it is to find C&C's with 100,000 drones; and secondly, law enforcement tends to focus on networks with more drones. The bad guys obviously understand this and have figured out a very unique way to respond to the increase interest in botnet operator arrests.

Botnet intelligence teams like DISOG encourage gathering intelligence on botnet operators, not just the networks they are running.

Botnet statistics teams ...aka census bureaus... produce interesting numbers, but they tend to increase the publics fear over these nets while providing little or no education for the end users.

Until law enforcement accepts that the botnet operator is the danger, not the net they run; operators will continue to have us under their thumb.

Botnet research teams should move from statistical analysis of the botnets and focus on creating education materials that can be used by law enforcement, public agencies and private security firms.

Lets face it, we all know botnets exist, but frankly, due to the distributed structure of the new nets, some of these numbers are misleading. Are there really 1500 botnet operators operating nets right now, or 150 operators running 10 C&C's each?

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Wednesday, January 03, 2007

Malware evading sandboxes using rootkits

As we have reported previously more and more bot herders are using rootkit technologies.

Sure, this will help evade anti-virus signatures, but we've also found that it will evade many of the new automated sandbox techniques used by security groups. The popular Norman and CW Sandbox solutions are easily evaded because of the way they watch for malware.

I have verified these claims with the malware I used in my December 23rd, 2006 blog entry. Sure enough, both Norman and CWSandbox (Sunbelt) fail to find any traffic related to the bot. This bot used HackerDefender, which is a very old (in terms of Internet Life) rootkit. Newer rootkits like Rustock will prove to be just as effective.

Couple these rootkits with a high strength protector like Themida and many automated solutions will be crippled. If you have more malware that is not found using Norman or CWSandbox, please let me know via email: nalbright disog.org

I'd like to applaud the Chas Tomlin. Because of the techniques he uses to harvest malware data, his sandbox accurately identified the Themida as the protector, and captured the IP, Username, passwords, basicly enough information to successfully launch a bot snoop on this network. In all fairness the Tomlin sandbox did not identify the registry keys and files dropped by HackerDefender either, but the details given by their report are significantly more helpful in terms of botnet monitoring.

I'm not just tooting Chas's horn either, here are all three results:
ChasT Sandbox - PRIVATE SANDBOX
Details
md5sum: 17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566
original filename: alt.exe
submission date: 2007-01-03
bitdefender: no virus found
Files
binary: 17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566
size: 1231 Kbytes
pcap size: 3749 bytes
[Themida -> http://www.oreans.com SN:732]
IRC
server ip: 72.20.46.166
server fqdn: dead.leechnet.net
port: 6667
server password: null
nick: [0]NT|4004554
user: GBR[XP]4004554 0 0 :[0]NT|4004554
mode: -x+Bi
channel: #ing2
channel password: x
ctcp version: iroffer v1.4
DNS
dead.leechnet.net


Norman Sandbox Data: (http://www.norman.com)

alt.exe : Not detected by Sandbox (Signature: NO_VIRUS)

[ General information ]
* Anti debug/emulation code present.
* File length: 1260032 bytes.
* MD5 hash: 17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566.

[ Changes to filesystem ]
* Creates file C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\drivers\oreans32.sys.

[ Changes to registry ]
* Creates key "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\oreans32".
* Sets value "ImagePath"="C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\oreans32.sys" in key "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\oreans32".
* Sets value "DisplayName"="oreans32" in key "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\oreans32".

[ Process/window information ]
* Creates an event called XprotEvent.
* Attempts to access service "oreans32".
* Creates service "oreans32 (oreans32)" as "C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\oreans32.sys".

[ Signature Scanning ]
* C:\WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\drivers\oreans32.sys (33952 bytes) : no signature detection.

(C) 2004-2006 Norman ASA. All Rights Reserved.



CWSandbox - Sunbelt Edition (http://research.sunbelt-software.com/ViewMalware.aspx?id=48760):

ID 48760
Comment None
Flag 1

Analysis Summary:
Analysis Date 12/24/2006 3:06:52 AM
Sandbox Version 1.97
Filename 17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566.exe

Technical Details:
Analysis Number 1
Parent ID 0
Process ID 1988
Filename c:\temp\17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566.exe
Filesize 1260032 bytes
MD5 17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566
Start Reason AnalysisTarget
Termination Reason Timeout
Start Time 00:00.094
Stop Time 01:00.141
Detection - (Authentium Command Antivirus - EngVer: 4.92.123.35 - SigVer: 20061128 35)
- (BitDefender Antivirus - EngVer: 7.0.0.2311 - SigVer: 7.10213)
- (CounterSpy - EngVer: 2.1.628.0 - SigVer: 455)
- (Microsoft Malware Protection - EngVer: 1.1.1804.0 - SigVer: Wed Nov 29 13:21:33 2006)
- (Norton AntiVirus - EngVer: 20061.3.0.12 - SigVer: 20061129 13:19:28)
DLL-Handling
Loaded DLLs
c:\temp\17117253f5e25028d58d24cacebed566.exe
C:\WINDOWS\System32\ntdll.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\kernel32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\COMCTL32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\GDI32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\USER32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\ADVAPI32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\RPCRT4.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\oleaut32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\system32\MSVCRT.DLL
C:\WINDOWS\system32\OLE32.DLL
C:\WINDOWS\System32\wsock32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\WS2_32.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\WS2HELP.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\pstorec.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\ATL.DLL
C:\WINDOWS\System32\Wship6.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\iphlpapi.dll
C:\WINDOWS\System32\Secur32.dll
USER32.dll
ADVAPI32.dll
NTDLL.dll
ADVAPI32.DLL
.\UxTheme.dll
Filesystem
New Files
C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\oreans32.sys
Opened Files
\\.\SICE
\\.\SIWVID
\\.\NTICE
\\.\Global\oreans32
\\.\PIPE\svcctl
Chronological order
Open File: \\.\SICE (OPEN_EXISTING)
Open File: \\.\SIWVID (OPEN_EXISTING)
Open File: \\.\NTICE (OPEN_EXISTING)
Open File: \\.\Global\oreans32 (OPEN_EXISTING)
Create File: C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\oreans32.sys
Open File: \\.\PIPE\svcctl (OPEN_EXISTING)
Service Management Open Service Manager - Name: "SCM"
Open Service - Name: "oreans32"
Create Service - Name: (oreans32) Display Name: (oreans32) File Name: (C:\WINDOWS\system32\drivers\oreans32.sys) Control: () Start Type: (SERVICE_SYSTEM_START)
Start Service - Name: (oreans32) Display Name: () File Name: () Control: () Start Type: ()
System Info Get System Directory
Get System Time
Window Enum Windows

Analysis Number 2
Parent ID 0
Process ID 672
Filename services.exe
Filesize 101376 bytes
MD5 e3df4a0252d287c44606ee55355e1623
Start Reason SCM
Termination Reason Timeout
Start Time 00:01.641
Stop Time 01:00.312
Service Management Load Driver - Name: (\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\oreans32) File Name: ()



In short, when evaluating your sandbox solution, please be sure to test it with different rootkits!